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Sketch of the Balance of Payments
Since the War
An appraisal of our international payments position needs to take
account of the way it has evolved in recent years and of the varied
forces which have shaped its development. The point of central interest
is the size and persistence of the deficit. Section 1 of this chapter traces
the course of the deficit over the postwar period and considers some
of its cumulative effects, and is also concerned with the concept of
the deficit and how the deficit appears according to alternative methods
of measurement.1 Section 2 reviews our balance-of-payments experience
more broadly and relates developments in our foreign trade and other
transactions to the course of events in the United States economy and
in the rest of the world. Section 3 discusses the problem of making
valid generalizations about our balance-of-payments position and how
it has altered over the postwar period.
1.The Concept and Evolution of the Deficit
DIsTINcrroN BETWEEN LIQUm CAPITAL MOVEMENTS
AND TRANSACrIONS
The approach taken here reflects the view that it is useful to
distinguish flows of liquid capital from other transactions in the balance
of payments. In recent years, liquid funds have proved to be extremely
mobile, as evidenced by the data given in Table 1 on the large
recorded flows of United States and foreign private short-term capital
1 For a fuller discussion of concepts and methods of measurement of the
balance of payments, see Appendix A.
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1950 — 3,432 — 127. — 21 — 3,580
1951 — 717 — 85 477 — 305
1952 — 1,599 — 48 601 — 1,046
1953 — 2,608 117 339 — 2,152
1954 — 1,054 — 669 173 — 1,550









1958 — 3,655 — 362 488 3,529
1959 .— 4,232
(—4,667)h
77 412 — 3,743
(—4,178)h
1960 — 1,900 —1,433 — 592 — 3,925
1.961 — 527
(—1,216)h









581 — 103 4 — 680
375 — 260 — 140 — 775
III 443 — 555 — 159 — 1,157
IV 501 — 515 — 297 — 1,313
1981,1 116 — 406 — 29 — 319
fl 858
(134)h
— 316 — 366 176
(—548)h






IV — 633 — 375 — 400 — 1,408
. (—673)h (— 1,448)h
1982 I — 268 — 314 106 — 476
II — 110
(—186)"









1950.1962k —23,085 —5,143 2,956 —25,272
1950-1957 —12,341 —1,624 3,772 —10,193
1958.1962k —10,744 —3,519 — 818 —15,079TABLE 1(concluded)
Increasein U.S. Liquid
Liabilitiesd to Other Increase in Gold
Than Foreign MonetaryDeficit (—)U.S.Liquid Sales or
Authorities on OfficialLiabihtiesdPurchases
Settlementsto Foreign(—)bythe
Commercial Basis Monetary United
Banks Other (4+5+6)e Statesg
Period (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
1950 303 —35 —3.312 1,569 1,743
1951 498 845 538 —485 —53
1952 31 198 —822 1,201 —379
1953 —59 107 —2,104 943 1,161
1954 —41 68 —1,523 1,225 298
1955 414 —10 — 700 41
1958 419 255 —261 567 —306
1957 50 575 1,145 —347 —798
1958 48 454 —3,027 752 2,275
1959 1,140 320 —2,283 1,552 731
(_2,718)h
1960 104 257 —3,564 1,882 1,702
1961 615 587 —1,259 517 742
(—1,948)h
1962i —80 387 —1,689 979 710
(—2,418)"
Quartersi
1980 I 457 —19 —203 153 50
II 132 203 —558 482 94
111 5 —47 —1,233 596 637
IV —490 120 —1,572 651 921
1961 I —19 —55 — 382 36 348
II 414 156 659 —329 —330
(—65)"
III 154 80 —675 405 270
(—600)h
IV 66 406 —861 405 456
(_
1962 I 429 263 230 —420 190
II —256 246 —322 529 —207
(—.-




8,477 8,406 —18,480 10,790 7,890
1950-1957 1,615 1,498 —7,080 5,373 1,707
1,862 1,908 —11,400 5,417 5,983
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NOTES TO TABLE 1
aGoodsand services (including military expenditures), government grants
and capital, and private long-term investment.
b Less net inflow of funds through changes in foreign commercial credits to
the United States (these changes being netted out in column 2 rather than included
in columns 5 and 6 in order to conform to the Commerce Department's present
method of calculating the deficit).
Equals, with signs reversed, sum of columns 5, 6, 8, and 9. But see notes
i and j.
d:As defined by the Commerce Department, liquid liabilities include foreign
holdings of deposits, U.S. Treasury bills and certificates, bankers' acceptances,
commercial paper, and other short-term claims on the United States (and also
foreign holdings of U.S. government bonds) as reported by banks in the United
States, government agencies, and nonfinancial concerns (i.e., exporters, importers,
and industrial and commercial firms). For the years 1950-1954 it is assumed that
all transactions of foreign countries in U.S. government bonds were for the account
of foreign monetary authorities; thereafter an estimated division is made between
these and other accounts.
with signs reversed, sum of columns 8 and 9.
f Includes changes in U.S. liquid liabilities to the International Monetary Fund.
glncludes, beginning March 1961, changes in holdings of foreign convertible
currencies by the U.S. monetary authorities.
h Figures adjusted to exclude effects of unscheduled repayments of foreign obli-
gations to the U.S. Government, as follows: 1959, $150 million in first quarter and
$285 million in fourth quarter; 1961, $724 million in second quarter, of which $75
million was advanced from the third quarter, and $40 million in the fourth quarter;
1962,: $76 million in the second quarter and $471 million in the third quarter.
i First nine months (preliminary data) at annual rate, seasonally adjusted
except as explained in note j.
i Columns 1 to 4 are seasonally adjusted. (Quarterly figures in columns 5, 6,
8, and 9 add to the amounts given in column 4 before seasonal adjustment of the
latter.)
kThrough third quarter of 1962.
P Preliminary data.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce.
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•as well as by thecapitalmovements which may be inferred from the
behavior of unrecorded transactions (that is, errors and omissions) •2
Themonetary authorities are accordingly confronted with new prob-
lems because of their ability to influence the cost and availability of
credit and, hence, to affect the conditions determining international
flows of liquid funds.
This is not to say that variations in the size and direction of liquid
capital movements are to be explained only, or mainly, by changes in
relative interest rates at home and abroad. The determining conditions
are varied and variable. The steps towards external ("nonresident")
currency convertibility taken by most Western European countries at
the end of 1958 and subsequently by Japan were especially important
both in enabling their banking and business concerns to increase
working balances in the United States and in removing an obstacle to
the extension of American credits to these countries. Changes in the
value of several leading currencies and speculation of varying intensity
in these and other currencies, including the dollar, have also been
important influences, along with more usual economic forces affecting
the demand for credit and the flow of funds. Moreover, changes in
credit conditions in different countries will have more effect on some
kinds of capital flows than on others. To allow for such factors is,
however; a very different matter than to conclude that—under any
given set of circumstances—a change in interest rates in the United
States compared with those in other financial centers would have little
effect on capital flows between them or on the relative .size of their
credit extensions to third countries.
Other sectors of the balance of payments are subject to a different
or wider range Of economic forces, as in the case of foreign trade and
investment, or are determined essentially by political objectives, as
in the case of economic aid and military expenditures abroad. Respon-
sibility for policies affecting these different activitiesisdispersed,
2is usual to define liquid capital movements in terms of the characteristics
of the assets acquired—that is, whether or not the assets can be turned into cash
quickly and without appreciable loss. The United States monetary authorities may,
however, be more concerned with keeping fresh outflows of liquid funds from
becoming unduly large than with the possibility of obtaining the liquidation and
return of American funds which have already been placed abroad. From this point
of view, one may think of liquid capital movements as embracing more or less the
whole of so-called "short-term" capital movements, and some types of "long-term"
capital movements as well.
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except as they are coordinated at the highest levels of government.
Monetary policy has little or no effect on some of these items and
influences others only indirectly and gradually through changes in
incomes, prices, and profits. From the standpoint of balance-of-payments
objectives, these various types of transactions tend to be slow to adjust
in the desired way and sometimes act perversely. It is, however, also
appropriate to describe them as "basic transactions," since their com-
bined behavior provides a measure of the adequacy of this country's
competitive strength and its ability to defend the value of its currency.
This does not mean that an even balance on basic transactions
is necessarily a sufficient goal of policy. An appropriate objective in
this regard would have to be determined in the light of various con-
siderations, including views and policies with respect to the size of
liquid capital flows.3 The distinguishing feature of the latter as con-
trasted with basic transactions is, however, that the monetary authorities
have the possibility of acting quickly so as to keep outflows of liquid
funds within tolerable limits and ward off excessive demands on gold
arising from this source. A solution to the payments problem need not
therefore require raising the surplus on goods and services by enough
to cover these flows along with all the other more stubborn burdens
resting on the balance of payments.
The size of the problem presented by liquid capital flows is inade-
quately revealed by the data provided through the reporting network
of banks and business concerns in this country. Americans may, for
instance, hold deposits directly in foreign banks rather than through
American banks, or buy and sell other foreign assets through channels
which pass outside the reporting system. Similar possibilities exist with
respect to shifts of foreign capital into and out of the United States.
A clue to such transfers may be found in the balance-of-payments entry
for "unrecorded transactions," though this residual item registers the
net effect of all errors and omissions, wherever they may arise in the
balance of payments, and could not be attributed only to unreported
capital movements. The play of capital movements is, however, sug-
gested by the sudden shift in this item after 1959. Though varying in
The composition of liquid capital movements is also important since, depend-
ing on their nature, they may affect the availability of funds for payments on basic
transactions. To take one example, further commented on below, the growth of
American credits to Japan in 1980 and 1961 undoubtedly contributed to the rise
in United States exports to that country.
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size from year to year, it had been regularly positive in sign, indicative
of net unrecorded receipts, during the whole of the period 1951 to
1959 (Table 1), and averaged some $500 million per year. It then
shifted abruptly to a minus quantity of approximately $600 million in
both 1960 and 1961 and even more in 1962 on the basis of data for
the first nine months. This turnabout of $1.1 billion gives some reason
to suppose that the large negative residuals which started in 1960
may considerably understate the amount of unreported capital outflows
and their contribution to the large deficits of the last three years as
measured by the Commerce Department.4 Philip Bell, in a correlatIon
analysis covering the period 1952-1961, found that the entry for unre-
corded transactions had, in fact, varied closely with the reported move-
ments of United States private short-term capital, and he estimated
that the amount of unreported capital flow of this nature was well in
excess of $1 billion in both 1960 and
THE SIZE ANDCUMULATIVEEFFECF OF THE DEFICIT
Table 1 shows the balance on basic transactions as here defined,
comprising exports and imports of goods and services, government
4 This reasoning presupposes that the errors and omissions which accounted
for the plus residuals in the 1950's (and which could represent either an under-
estimate of receipts or an overestimate of payments on "recorded" transactions)
have persisted on into later years, but, since 1960, have been outweighed by
unrecorded capital outflows. As an alternative, or complementary, explanation, it
is possible that the phenomena responsible for the residuals have now been reversed.
Thus, there is good cause to think that, in the earlier period, Europeans wanting
to escape exchange controls or the risk of devaluation, and Latin American dictators
or others wanting to hedge against the future, acquired assets in the United States,
and that they may now have ceased to do so or even shifted funds from the United
States to other countries. Many such transactions would have been handled through
domestic names and addresses or in other ways so that both the earlier inflows and
the later outflows of funds would have escaped the reports filed by American banks
and businesses on their liabilities to foreigners or other records of capital movements.
5PhilipW. Bell, "Private Capital Movements and the U.S. Balance-of-Pay-
ments Position," in Factors Affecting the United States Balance of Payments (Joint
Economic Committee), Washington, December 1962, pp. 395-481. Bell reports a
particularly close relation between unrecorded transactions and (1) claims on
Canada and Europe reported by nonfinancial concerns in the United States and (2)
foreign-currency claims on Canada reported by United States banks. His study also
contains a useful statement of the reasons why capital movements may fail to be
caught by the reporting system. For a fuller statement of the sources of errors and
omissions in the estimates, see Walther Lederer, "Measuring the Balance of Pay-
ments," American Statistical Association, 1961 Proceedings of the Business and
Economics Statistics Section, Washington, 1962, pp. 42-44.
17—
TheUnited States as World Trader and Banker
grants and capital, and private long-term investment. It also shows
the balance including, in accordance with the Commerce Department's
practice, transfers of United States private short-term capital and
unrecorded transactions. When the net flow on these latter items is
inward, as was generally true of the 1950's, the adverse balance on the
Commerce Department's definition is smaller than that on basic trans-
actions. The opposite result ensues when these flows are outward, as
in 1960 and 1961.
Without exhausting the range of possibilities, Table 1 presents
the balance according to yet another concept—that is, on the basis of
"official settlements." The rationale of this concept is that changes in.
liquid liabilities to foreign private holders6 are not merely a passive
consequence of the state of the United States balance of payments, as
might be true of changes in the reserves of the monetary authorities,
but reflect rather the positive interest of foreign commercial banks,
business concerns, and other holders in increasing or, on occasion,
decreasing their working balances and other liquid assets in dollars.
Changes in these assets, like those in United States private short-term
claims on other countries, would therefore be entered in the balance
of payments before computing the deficit or surplus, leaving gold sales
or purchases and changes in the liquid claims of the monetary authori-
ties as the direct measure, with signs reversed, of the balance.
The "official settlements" measure of the balance is, however,
deficient in that some central banks, in addition to their direct dollar
claims on the United States, have come to hold important dollar balances
through commercial banks in their own or other countries.7 An uncertain
but apparently significant part of what appears in United States sta-
6 See Table 1, columns 5 and 8. In addition to nonbanking concerns and
private individuals, column 6 includes foreign government agencies other than
central banks and treasuries, and international organizations other than the Inter-
national Monetary Fund.
7 Oscar Altman estimates that the central banks and monetary authorities of
twenty or twenty-five countries hold deposits of dollars or sterling (mainly dollars)
outside the United States and the United Kingdom, respectively. He further esti-
mates that these official dollar deposits account for the greater part of the dollar
funds employed in the "Euro-dollar market"—that is, the multibillion-dollar inter-
national money market developed during the last four or five years by commercial
banks in London, Montreal, Paris, and other financial centers for deposit and loan
operations in U.S. dollar funds. See Oscar L. Altman, "Recent Developments in
Foreign Markets for Dollars and Other Currencies," in Factors Affecting the United
States Balance of Payments (Joint Economic Committee), Washington, December
1982, pp. 488-523.
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tistics as liabilities to foreign commercial banks therefore really belongs
to central banks. Shifts between official and private dollar accounts in
the United. States may occur for other reasons as well, so that it be-
comes difficult to assign a clear meaning to changes in these separate
categories.8
All 'three concepts of the balance of payments portrayed in Table 1
are alike in showing deficits most of the time, and very large cumulative
deficits, over the period 1950 through the first nine months of 1962.
The cumulative deficit is largest on the Commerce Department's defi-
nition, amounting to $25.3 billion, of which $15.1 billion is accounted
for by the last four and three-quarters years. The cumulative deficit
on basic transactions is only moderately smaller for the whole of
the period, but with rather more of it in the earlier part and some $10.7
billion in the later part. As measured by official settlements, the cumu-
lative figure for the twelve and three-quarters years is $18.5 billion,
or considerably smaller than on either of the other two bases, but that
for the later part of the period isslightly larger than the deficit
on basic transactions. In all cases the deficits for some of the more
recent years are greater still if the figures are adjusted, as also indicated
in the table, to exclude advance repayments of foreign debt to the
United States Government.
As noted in Chapter I, the balance-of-payments deficits incurred
prior to the Suez crisis of 1956-57 served an essential purpose in enabling
other countries to rebuild their monetary reserves and in laying the basis
for the subsequent restoration of currency convertibility. Under these
circumstances, the deficits of that period could scarcely be regarded,
even now, as early evidence of some competitive inadequacy, especially
in view of the prevalence at that time of discrimination against imports
from the dollar area. But they may nevertheless have contributed
significantly to our subsequent difficulties by permitting the balance
8 This problem is illustrated by the following passage from the International
Monetary Fund's Annual Report 1962, p. 171: "Because world reserves conven-
tionally cover only official holdings, their size is affected by transactions between
the official sector and the private bank and nonbank sectors. Shifts of this sort may
reach significant proportions. In December 1961, for example, the German commer-
cial banks converted into deutsche mark foreign assets in excess of $600 million for
seasonal requirements, including window dressing purposes. Most of this was
reflected in an increase in the Bundesbank's net reserves. An even larger amount
of such assets was deposited abroad by the commercial banks in the following month.
If it had not been for this single factor, world official exchange holdings would have
shown only a very small increase during 1961."
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of payments to assume a structure which, with the added burdens
and increased foreign competition of later years, has proved difficult
to correct
Though the deficits registered since the Suez crisis have been large
by any standard, they show a rather different size and evolution accord-
ing to which of the three concepts is considered. They appear largest
and most stubborn on the method of measurement employed by the
Commerce Department. On this basis, and adjusted to exclude debt
prepayment to the United States Government, the deficit reached a
peak of $4.2 billion in 1959, remained over $3 billion in 1961, and was
still at an annual rate of $2.6 billion in the first nine months of 1962.
On the basic transactions concept, and again adjusted to exclude debt
prepayment, the deficit was as high as $4.7 billion in 1959 but fell to
$1.9 billion in 1960 and to an even lower level in 1961 and 1962.
Measured by official settlements, the deficit rose to a peak of more
than $3.5 billion in 1960, dipped below the $2 billion level in 1961,
but then rose again to a rate of $2.4 billion on the average for January-
September 1962.
All three methods of measurement thus show a decline in the
deficit in the last two years compared with earlier levels. The improve-
ment has not yet gone far enough, however, to preclude a further
deterioration in our reserve position. The composition of official settle-
ments given in Table 1 is of interest in this regard. Of the cumulative
total of these settlements from 1950 to 1956, about 30 per cent was in
gold and the remainder in the form of increases in the liquid dollar
assets of foreign and international monetary authorities. For the period
1958 through September 1962, more than 50 per cent was in gold. This
change seems to suggest that, as the cumulative effect of the United
States deficits and the rise in other countries' reserves, foreign monetary
authorities have become more disposed to regard gold as the preferred
means of receiving settlement.9
Evidence which runs "contrary to a so-called 'rush' to obtain gold"
has been developed by Oscar Altman in an analysis of the relation
9Theshare of gold in official settlements could also vary, without signifying
a shift in foreign preferences, if in one period gains in reserves accrued chiefly to
countries which hold their reserves largely in dollars and in another period to
countries which hold them predominantly in gold. For an analysis of central bank
practices in this regard, see a forthcoming study by Peter B. Kenen, Reserve-Assets
Preferences of Central Banks and Stability of the Gold-Exchange Standard, Prince-
ton Studies in International Finance No. 10.
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between United States gold movements and the size of its balance-of-
payments deficit or surplus as measured by official settlements. On the
basis of the relation for the period 1946 to 1961 (depicted in Chart 3),
Altman found that, as long as official settlements made by the United
States did not exceed $350 million per year, other countries added these
receipts to their dollar balances rather than take gold, but that each
increment in official settlements above that level was effected to the
extent of some 55 per cent in gold.1° It would therefore be the increased
size of the United States balance-of-payments deficits after 1957 rather
than a shift in foreign preferences that explains the higher proportion
settled in gold.
Altman's results would not appear, however, to eliminate the
hypothesis that the preferences of foreign monetary authorities have
shifted toward gold. If the points for the years 1949 to 1956, designated
by circles in Chart 3, are looked at in isolation from those for other
years, they do not show a very clear pattern.1' Six of the eight years
form a cluster from which no dominant relation emerges, and the gold
outflow for the whole of the 1949-1956 period was smaller, and that
for 1958-1961 larger, than would be indicated by Altman's equation.
Irrespective of whether or not there has been a shift in foreign prefer-
ences, however, the more important conclusion suggested by Altman's
analysis is that the United States could scarcely expect to continue to
run large deficits without further substantial gold losses.
10 See Oscar L. Altman, "Quélques Aspects du Problème de 1'Or," Cahiers de
l'Institut de Science Econoinique Appliquée, Series R, No. 7, October 1962. With
the balance-of-payments deficit defined (1) by official settlements (as in Chart 3)
and (2) by official settlements plus the increase in liquid dollar holdings of foreign
commercial banks, the relations found by Altman for the period 1946 to 1981 are
expressed by the following equations (in billions of dollars):
(1) Gold outflow =—0.200+ 0.586 deficit
(2) Gold outflow =—0.282+ 0.543 deficit
If the years of large U.S. balance-of-payments surpluses (1946-1948) are eliminated,
the corresponding equations for the period 1949 to 1961 are:
(la) Cold outflow =—0.284+ 0.614 deficit
(2a) Cold outflow =—0.348+ 0.580 deficit
11 As Altman indicates (see preceding note), it may be preferable to disregard
the early postwar years of large United States surpluses.





U.S. Balance of Payments and GoldMovements, 1947 to 1961
NOTE: Reproduced from data supplied by Oscar L. Altman (see note 10,
Chapter 2). The balance-of-payments surplus or deficit corresponds to the "ofilcial
settlements" concept, adjusted (along with the data on gold movements) to exclude
gold sales to the United States by the International Monetary Fund in 1956, 1959,
and 1960 for the purpose of acquiring income-earning U.S. Treasury bills and notes.
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2.TheChanging Characteristics of the Balance of Payments
RELIEF AND RECONSTRUCrION PERIOD, 1946-1949
In current perspective, the immediate postwar years are of interest
chiefly as a reminder of the one-sided strength of the United States
at that time, but they are of little use as a basis for judging the subse-
quent evolution of trade and payments. The dominant feature .of this
period was the huge excess of United States. exports over imports of
goods and services, totaling $32 billion for the four years 1946-1949.
Exports fell off sharply after 1947, as shown in Chart 4, arid a rise in
the value of imports also helped to reduce the disparity but was inter-
rupted by the 1948-49 recession in the United States.'2
This vast export surplus was made possible chiefly by various types
of public financing, including final deliveries under relief and rehabili-
tation programs inaugurated during the war, the special loan of $3.75
billion to the United Kingdom in 1946, Export-Import Bank loans, and
the beginning of the Marshall Plan for European recovery in 1948.
In addition, foreign countries liquidated gold and dollar holdings to
a total of $7 billion, two-thirds of it in 1947 alone.
The payments problems of the period were aggravated by the
flight of capital from other countries on the part of those wishing to
escape exchange controls or the risks of devaluation. As one indication of
these capital flows, unexplained receipts (errors and omissions) in
the U.S. balance of payments totaled $3.1 billion from 1947 through
the' third quarter of 1949 and then, after the devaluation of European
currencies, promptly shifted to a small outflow.
WARPERIOD,1950-1952
Whether in quick response to the currency devaluation of Sep-
tember 194913 or because of an upturn in business in this country,
United States imports soon began to strengthen. The great boost came,
however, with the demands generated by the Korean conflict: as the
result of increases in both prices and quantities, the value of United
'2Balance..of..payments figures for postwar years are also given in Appendix B.
13 The leading countries devalued as follows: United Kingdom, along with
most of the overseas members of the sterling area and also Sweden, Norway,
Denmark, and the Netherlands, 30.5 per cent; France, 21.8 per cent compared with
the rates previously prevailing for commercial transactions; Federal Republic of
Germany, 20.6 per cent; Italy, 8 per cent; Belgium, 12.3 per cent (cf. International
Monetary Fund, Annual Report 1950, pp. 28-38).
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a Includesremittances and pensions.
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States imports of goods and services rose by some 60 per cent between
the fourth quarter of 1949 and the first quarter of 1951. Meanwhile,
exports had risen much more slowly, and, with foreign economic aid
at a high level, the United States registered its first large
postwar payments deficit of close to $4 billion, on the Commerce
definition, during the twelve, months from April 1950
to March 1951.
The position then shifted once more with great rapidity. Mer-
chandise imports weakened both in price and in volume during 1951
just after exports had begun to respond to the accumulation of purchas-
ing power abroad. During the twelve months to March 1952, despite
a growth in its military expenditures overseas, the United States reg-
istered a small balance-of-payments surphis (again on the Commerce
Department basis). By the second half of 1952, however, exports also
fell back with the slowing down of economic expansion in Europe and
the depletion of the extraordinary buying power acquired by some of
the primary producing countries at the peak of the Korean inflation.
WORLD ECONOMIC EXPANSION, 1958-1957
After a pause in 1952, economic activity in other leading industrial
countries expanded strongly for five years (Chart 5), and the value of
world trade rose no less than 85 per cent. The increase in United States
exports was even more vigorous—some 46 per cent—and was con-
centrated in 1956 and 1957 as demands on the United States stemming
from the investment boom abroad were reinforced by the closure of
the Suez Canal.
Economic activity in the United States developed more irregularly,
passing into a recession in 1953-54, rising again strongly until the end
of 1956, and then turning down again in the latter part of 1957
(Chart 6). Imports of merchandise roughly paralleled the course of
industrial production and rose by 22 per cent in value over the five
years. Inclusive of services, the rise in imports was greater, about
one-third, because of the rapid growth in United States military expen-
ditures and tourist outlays abroad but, even so, did not keep pace
with the increase in exports of goods and services.
Price increases contributed something to the rise in the value of
trade in both directions and were of chief significance in steel and
machinery among exports and in raw materials among imports.




Production and Exports of the
United States and of Other Countries
NOTE:. Data are seasonally adjusted.
Billions of donors





1950'51 '52'53'54'55'56'57'58'59'60 '61'62CHART 6
U.S. Industrial Production and Imports
NOTE: Data are seasonally adjusted.
U.S.Department of Commerce, Federal Reserve Board, and the OECD.
export surplus on goods
was a striking
and services from the post-Koreanlow of
$400 million in 1958 to $5,750 million in 1957. There was, however, a
strong offsetting, and related, increase over the period in the outflow
of capital, especially into natural resource development in Canada,
Latin America, and the MiddleEast. The deficit in .the balance of
payments therefore did not disappear until the 1956-57 spurt in exports,
28
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and even then only momentarily. By that time, foreign exchange diffi-
culties were being experienced by several of the major trading countries.
These difficulties stemmed in part from a steep rise in imports, as in
Japan and the Netherlands, and in part from the flight of capital,14
as in the United Kingdom. In either event, policies of restraint became
necessary.
THE SWOLLEN DEFICITS OF 1958 AND 1959
The second half of 1957 brought a pronounced change in the
world economic climate and in United States foreign trade. In most
foreign industrial countries there was oniy a pause or, at worst, a
moderate decline in business activity as reflected in their indexes of
industrial production, yet world trade reacted sharply. The fall in
United States exports was especially severe from mid-1957 to mid-1958
and extended on into the following year. On the other hand, the decline
in production in the United States was much more pronounced than
abroad, yet its imports weakened only moderately and then, as business
activity turned up earlier than in most other countries, climbed by some
25 per cent from the third quarter of 1959.
Shaped first by the fall in exports and then by the rise in imports,
the United States surplus on goods and services dwindled in 1958 and
momentarily disappeared in the first half of 1959. The net outflow of
private long-term capital fell back in 1958 from the very high 1957
level and, as credit conditions tightened in the United States, dropped
still more sharply in 1959, but far from enough to offset the fall in
exports. Government economic assistance, which after the end of the
European Recovery Program had been going in gradually rising amounts
to other areas, receded only slightly after 1957, though 1959 brought
14 The importance of speculative movements is again suggested by the behavior
of the residual item (errors and omissions) in the United States balance of payments,
i.e., the large unidentified receipts from the third quarter of 1958 through the third
quarter of 1957:
(quarterly data, seasonally adjusted, in millions of dollars)
I II III IV
1956 —15 —12 179 391
1957 448 377 363 —31
These unrecorded receipts contributed importantly to• the balance-of-payments
surplus in 1957, as measured by the Commerce Department, and the balance on
basic transactions continued to show a deficit even in that year (Table 1).
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the first advance repayments of foreign debt to the United States Gov-
ernment. The net effect was the emergence of a deficit on basic trans-
actions of almost $3.7 billion in 1958 and $4.2 billion in 1959—$4.7
billion, in fact, exclusive of the special receipts from debt prepayments.15
These changes opened a new era of intensified competition for
the United States, marked by the success of foreign manufacturers
in penetrating the American market and in raising their share of third
markets as well as by the disappearance of specific shortages abroad
which had provided extraordinary outlets for many United States prod-
ucts during the earlier postwar years. The dramatic nature of the
change was, however, greatly accentuated by a number of attendant
circumstances which contributed to the exceptional rise 'in United
States exports to a peak in early 1957 and to their exceptional fall over
the next two years. The easing of boom conditions abroad, though
moderate, was enough to dissipate the postwar atmosphere of scarcity
and to provoke extensive liquidation of inventories of industrial mate-
rials along with some slowing down of investment activity, particularly
in the extractive industries. At the same time other circumstances—
including the Suez crisis, changes in United States export pricing policy
for cdtton, the changeover from propeller-driven to jet aircraft, and
the steel strike of 1959—intensffied the rise and fall in exports of
petroleum, coal, and other major items.
The effects of these in Table 2.
It will be noted that the items in Groups I and II accounted for almost
half of the increase in total exports from 1953-1955 to 1957 and for
virtually all of the fall from 1957 to 1959. Since then, exports in the
first group have shown little strength, but those in the second group
returned in 1960 to the 1957 level, or approximately twice that of
1953-1955. Exports in Group III (including a number of capital goods
and consumer manufactures as well as chemicals, some industrial mate-
rials, and food and accounting for over 60 per cent of total United
States exports) were only lightly touched by the decline in 1958 and
then increased in value to a level in 1961 more than 20 per cent higher
than in 1957 and more than 70 per cent higher than in 1953-1955. On
the other hand, the exports included in Group IV, headed by automo-
15Thedeficits in these years were, however, smaller on the Commerce Depart-
ment's definition (the difference being accounted for chiefly by unrecorded trans-










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































8The United States as World Trader and Banker
NOTES TO TABLE 2
GroupI:Exports which rose strongly to 1957, fell sharply to 1959, and
have not recovered earlier strength.
GroupII:, Exports which behaved like those in Group I to 1959 but have
since regained strength.
Group III:Exports whiöh were only moderately affected by the 1958 decline
and have grown well over the period as a whole.
Group IV:Exports which were only moderately affected by the 1958 decline
but have not grown much since.
aDomesticexports excluding grant-aid military equipment and supplies ex-
ported by Department of Defense under the Military Assistance Program.
SOURCE:Derived from data of the U.S. Department of Commerce.
tive products, showed little movement one way or the other over the
period, and in 1961 exceeded the 1953-1955 level by less than 10 per cent.
The startling upsurge in imports in 1959 was, in large part, the
result of the further penetration of the United States market by foreign
manufactures and other goods, but here also the effects of temporary
influences can be seen. For one thing, it is interesting to note that, of
the increase of $3.1 billion from 1953-1955 to 1959 in the growth items
included in Group I of Table 3, close to half came in 1959 alone. The
effects of the steel strike in that year are again visible in this develop-
ment. Another major influence was the upsurge in American demand
for foreign automobiles to a peak in 1959, together with the continued
building up of dealer outlets and stocks ahead of retail sales (Chart 7).
It will also be seen that the 1959 rise in imports of Group I was
reinforced, in the effect on total imports, by the strongly cyclical behav-
ior of the items in Group II. Over the past decade as a whole, however,
neither the items in Group II nor those in Group III have exhibited
any signfficant growth. Imports of petroleum (Group IV) grew swiftly
through 1958 until restrained by the imposition of import controls—
an action.with impQrtant balance-of-payments effects even if motivated,
as it seems to have been, by other considerations.'6
l6As indicated by the data in Table 3, the import control formula adopted in
1959 did not prevent renewed increases in petroleum imports in 1961 and 1962,
and apparently would have allowed a further substantial rise in 1963. On November
30, 1962, a revised formula was announced, designed to keep imports of crude oil,
unfinished oil, and finished products into the United States east of the Rocky











































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































3The United States as World Trader and Banker
NOTES TO TABLE 8
GioupI:Imports which have increased sharply since 1953-1955, with
especially strong impact in 1959.
GroupII:Imports with pronounced cyclical behavior.
Group III:Imports, showing little or no growth over the period.
Group IV:Strong growth until 1958 and forcibly restrained since.
aGeneralimports.
SoT.micE: Derived from data of the U.S. Department of Commerce
NEW STRAINS FROMCAI'ITu. IN 1960 AND 1961
Starting in the third quarter of 1959, exports staged a remarkable
turnaround and in the second half of 1961 reached a rate somewhat
higher than that achieved in the exceptional circumstances of 1957 and
about 25 per cent higher than in 1958-1959. Imports performed more
erratically, weakening with business activity here in the second half
of 1960 and then recovering strongly again in the second half of 1961
to about the same level as two years earlier.
The renewed strength of United States exports after 1959 was
largely in sales to other industrial countries, which have led the rise
in world trade. As shown in Table 4, the value of exports to Western
Europe and Japan averaged 90 per cent more in 1980-1961 than in
1953-1955. Exports to other countries outside the Western Hemisphere
also increased substantially, though this rise is attributable in good
part to United States Government assistance programs to India, Pakistan,
and southeast Asia. Exports to Canada and Latin America, on the
other hand, grew much less during this period and in 1960-1961 were
well below the levels which had been reached in 1956-1957. The heavy
weight of these Western Hemisphere countries in United States exports
—far greater than their share in world trade and greater still than their
share in exports of other industrial countries----could therefore be re-
garded as something of a drag on the development of total United
States exports. The table also suggests, however, that the buying power
of Canada and Latin America has suffered from the poor performance
of their exports to the United States, an effect largely attributable to
the general weakness of prices of primary products in the world's
markets, but intensified by the failure of the United States economy to




U.S. Imports and Retail Sales of Foreign
Automobiles, 1955-1962
U.S. Department of Commerce and Automotive News.
Chiefly because of the strengthening of exports and the slack in
imports much of the time, the deficit on basic transactions was sharply
reduced to $1.9 billion in 1960 and to $1.2 billion in 1961 (exclusive
of debt prepayment to the United States Government). In the first half
of 1961 a small surplus was even registered, on this accounting basis,
but a deficit emerged again in the second half of the year as imports
recovered and as government economic assistance rose abruptly.17
17 This increase was in considerable part due to capital subscriptions to inter-
national development agencies (see Table A-4).
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TABLE4











I.Growth and relative size of
foreign trade turnoverb















1960-1961 149 189 148 131 114 134
Percentage of total world trade
1953-1955 100 44.6 15.0 5.6 9.5 25.3
1960-1961 100 50.8 14.5 4.9 7.3 22.8
II.U.S. exports to areas specified
Index of value (1953-1955 =100)














1953-1955 100 81.6 23.8 24.9 19.8
1960-1961 100 40.4 19.4 18.0 22.2
III.U. S. imports from areas specified
Index of value (1953-1955 =100)
1956-1957 120 140 119 hOc 114
1958-1959 133 188 128 107c 120
1960-1961 187 206 128 lOic 126
Percentage distribution
1953-1955 100 23.0 28.1 30.9 23.1
1960-1961 100 34.6 21.6 22.7 21.2
SoulicE: For the United States, the Department of Commerce; for Latin
AmericanRepublics, International Monetary Fund (InternationalFinancial Sta-
tistics, September 1961 and October 1982); for othercountriesand country groups,
OECD (Overall Trade by Countries, Series A, June 1982).
NOTE: Data for the United States and for total world trade exclude U.S.
exports in Special Category Types I and II.
a European members of the OECD.
b Exports plus imports.
cIndexesof the value of U.S. trade with the Latin American republics, excluding
Cuba, are as follows (1953-1955 =100):
1956-19571958-19591960-1961.
U.S. exports 132 121 121
U.S.imports 111 106 109
Itmay be noted, however, that the levels of these index numbers for 1960-1981
were affected by the shift of U.S. sugar purchases away from Cuba, partly to other
Latin American countries, though partly to other areas also.
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Despite the notable reduction in the deficit on basic transactions
after 1959, the increase in foreign gold and liquid dollar holdings
through transactions with the United States (i.e., the deficit as defined
by the Commerce Department) remained at the high levels of $3.9
billion in 1960 and $2.5 billion in 1961 (or $3.1 billion adjusted to
exclude debt prepayments) because of the heavy recorded outflow of
United States private short-term capital and recorded transfers.
Of the recorded outflow of United States private short-term funds,
aggregating more than $3 billion from the beginning of 1960 through
the first quarter of 1962, almost 45 per cent went to Japan (Table 5),
largely in the form of trade and financial credits. The steep rise in
American credits to that country, accompanied by extensive credits also
European sources operating through the "Euro-dollar" market,
was occasioned by its balance-of-payments difficulties, the easing of
its restrictions on external borrowing, and apparently also by the keen
interest of American banks in strengthening their ties with the Japanese
economy.
During the second half of 1960, the spread in interest rates between
the United States and leading foreign financial centers which developed
as business turned down here while expansion continued abroad led
to substantial outflows of liquid funds. These operations, which added
to the loss of gold and appeared to mark a turn for the worse in the
United States balance of payments, sparked still other transfers attrib-
utable to a weakening of confidence in the dollar.
With regard to that part of these various credits and other transfers
reported by American banks and business concerns, it is difficult to
say how much they contributed to the balance-of-payments deficits of
1960 and 1961. To an appreciable extent they served to finance exports
which otherwise would not have been made unless the borrowers had
been able to obtain funds for this purpose from sources outside the
United States. On the other hand, those outflows of liquid funds which
passed outside the reporting network presumably did little to promote
exports and may have contributed far more to the loss of reserves than
might be judged merely from the residual item for unreported trans-
actions. According to the estimates previously noted,'8 these unrecorded
capital transfers may have approached in size the recorded flows in
















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































.Sketch of the Balance of Payments
THE BALANCE OF PAYMENTS IN 1962
On the surface, the balance of payments appeared to strengthen
encouragingly during the first half of 1962 and then to deteriorate
alarmingly once more in the third quarter. These abrupt shifts were,
however, largely attributable to short-run disturbances, including, in
particular, those associated with the depreciation and stabilization of
the Canadian dollar. These disturbances affected various components
of the balance of payments, including the timing of merchandise exports
and imports, but seem to have had an especially marked impact on
recorded short-term capital movements and on unrecorded transactions.
The variations from quarter to quarter were accordingly much more
violent in the deficit as measured by the Commerce Department than
in the deficit on basic transactions, as shown by the following figures
from Table 1 (quarterly, seasonally adjusted, .in millions of dollars):
1962
1961a I II lID
Deficit (—)onbasic transactions —132 —268 —110—52
Less: Debt prepayments 172 — 76 471
Deficit on basic transactions,
exclusive of debt prepayments —304 —268 —186—523
Add: Recorded outflow (—)ofU.S.
private short-term capitaic —333 —314 18—173
Unrecorded transactions —150 106 —134—494
Deficit on Commerce Department's
definition, exclusive of debt
prepayments —787 —476 —302—1,190
aQuarterlyrate.
bPreliminary.
aLesschanges in foreign commercial credits to the United States.
In view of these wide and partly offsetting swings in the quarterly
data, it is probably best to take the consolidated results for the nine
months as a guide to the recent status of the balance of payments.
These results, expressed as annual rates, are given in Table 6 along
with annual averages for earlier periods. It will be noted that the
deficit on basic transactions, exclusive of receipts from debt prepay-
ments, was at a rate of $1.3 billion, or somewhat less than the 1960-1961
average. There was an even larger reduction in the deficit as computed
by the Commerce Department, though, at a rate of $2.6 billion, it
remained much higher than the deficit on basic transactions, for reasons
partly hidden in unrecorded transactions.
Gross payments and gross receipts both rose to new high levels in
1962. Compared with the two preceding years, the principal increases
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in payments were in merchandise imports and in government economic
aid. The increases in the latter contributed, however, to the rise in
merchandise exports. Receipts were also buoyed up by the continued
rapid growth in income from foreign investments. Another important
contribution was military cash receipts by the United States Govern-
ment, including foreign official funds set aside at the Treasury during
the period against future orders and deliveries. Actual deliveries of
military goods and services during the nine months were only about
60 per cent as large as total cash receipts, and it is still too early to
judge what the future course of this item will be.
A question of major current interest concerns the effect which a
higher level of employment and production in the United States would
have on imports and other items in the balance of payments. It was
noted above that the reduction in the deficit on basic transactions after
1959 owed a good deal to the weakening of United States import
demand during the 1960-61 recession. Some ground for encouragement
may be found in the fact that the further reduction of the deficit during
1962 was achieved along with a significantly higher level of business
activity in this country. Reference to Table 3 shows that a marked
cyclical upturn in imports of industrial materials contributed importantly
to the rise in total imports. At the same time imports of consumer manu-
factures (other than automobiles) and capital equipment continued
to make impressive gains. It is noteworthy that the impact of these
developments on the trade balance was not more unfavorable than it
was, all the more so since exports to Japan fell off sharply after the
end of 1961 following measures taken by the Japanese authorities to
protect reserves and the drying up of new American credits to Japan
after the first quarter of It may be that this reduction has run its
courSe, now that Japan has been able to register some increase in its
reserves. The commodity detail given in Table 2 indicates that exports
of capital equipment continued during 1962 to provide the main
impetus to the growth in exports and suggests that the further growth
of the export total may depend heavily on the maintenance of a high
rate of investment activity in foreign countries.'9
19Exportsof foodstuffs also showed large gains, part of which may be attribut-
able to aid shipments and to temporary influences (including drought conditions
affecting foreign grain supplies and efforts by exporters to land shipments ahead
of the Common Market restrictions which became effective at the beginning of
August 1962). The exceptionally high level of these exports may, however, be set
off against the unusually iow level of cotton exports, as foreign buyers awaited an
expected reduction in the export price of cotton by the Department of Agriculture.
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TABLE6
U.S.BALANCE OF PAYMENTS BY SELECFED PERIODS, 1953 1962
(billions of dollars, annual averages or annual rates)
1958- 1956- 1958- 1960- 1962
1955 1957 1959 1981Jan.-Sept.
I.Basic transactions
U.S. payments, recorded: 20.8 26.8 28.4 30.2 32.4
Merchandise imports 11.0 13.0 14.1 14.8 16.1
Military expenditures 2.7 3.1 3.3 3.0 3.0
Other services 3.1 4.1 4.7 5.4 5•7
Remittances and pensions .6 .7 .8 .9
Government grants and
capital out±lows 2.4 8.0 3.1 3.7 4.3
U.S. private long-term
capital .9 2.9 2.5 2.5 2.3
U.S. receipts, recorded:
Including debt prepayments 18 9 26 1J24.5 28.9 31.8
Excluding debt prepaymentsJ 24.2 28.6 31.1
Merchandise exports 18.1 18.4 16.3 19.7 20.8
Military sales .2 .3 .3 .4 •9a
Investmentincome 2.2 2.7 2.9 3.5 4.0
Other services 2.7 3.6 3.8 4.0 4.4
Repayments on U.S. Government
loans
Ordinary repayments .5 .6 .6 .7 .6
Special prepayments .2 .8 .7
Foreign long-term investment
in U.S. .3 .5 .4 .4 .4
Balance on basic transactions:
Including debt prepayments 7 7 5 —1.2—.6





capitalb —.2 —.3 —.1 —1.4—.6
Unrecorded transactions .3 .8 .4 —.6—.7
Balance corresponding to Commerce
Department definition:
Including debt prepayments 6 —25 —3.8 —3.2 —1.9
Excluding debt prepayments j . . —3.9 —3.5 —2.6
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aIncludesdeliveries on military sales during the period and $360 million
(annual rate) transferred to restricted accounts with the U.S. Treasury against
military purchases to be made by foreign countries.
changes in foreign commercial credits to the United States.
NOTE: Detail may not add to totals shown because of rounding.
SOURCE: U.S. Department of Commerce.
3.The Selection of Periods for Comparison
This brief review of the shifting postwar scene underscores the diffi-
culty of making valid generalizations about our international payments
position and how it has altered during this time. Statements about the
"present" and how it has changed from the "past" are likely to be
influenced by the particular constellation of forces operating at one
time or another, some of which are more ephemeral than others. How,
then, can one sort out from the rest the more basic changes embodied
in the statistical record of our balance-of-payments experience?
A usual way of trying to meet such problems is to draw averages
for some base period and some terminal period, each long enough to
even out the effects of erratic influences and other abnormalities, and
thus permit comparisons between them without undue risk of distortion.
Such a method is difficult to apply to the relatively recent developments
considered here,2° especially when it is a question of characterizing the
current status of the balance of payments. There is no "terminal period"
marking an end to the phenomena considered, the most recent data
serve as only a rough guide to the near future, and averages could not
be extended back more than a few years without risk of concealing the
very, disturbances and adjustments of the past decade which need to
be identified. This difficulty is all the greater in that one could scarcely
include the developments of 1958 and 1959 without including also those
20 Some comparisons with prewar periods are given in the next chapter
(Chart 9), but it has to be remembered that the decade immediately preceding
the war was perhaps even, more disturbed than that immediately afterward because
of the Great Depression, exchange depreciation, trade controls, and the flight of
capital to the United States.
42Sketch of the Balance of Payments
of the preceding year or so, to which they were in considerable part a
reaction. For the current picture, it therefore seems best to concentrate
on the more recent figures and to introduce such qualifications as seem
appropriate for the effects of cyclical or erratic influences on them.
The choice äf an "initial" or base period, on the other hand, is less
circumscribed, though here also one would not wish to include any of
the years 1956 to 1959, nor to go back into the distorted relations imme-
diately following the war. One possibility would be to include the whole
of the intervening period, that is, the six years 1950 to 1955. This period,
starting just after the European currency devaluations of 1949, includes
all of the Korean episode, with effects first unfavorable and then favor-
able on the United States balance of payments, as well as the 1952
pause in Europe and the 1953-54 recession and ensuing recovery in the
United States. The inclusion of the Korean war experience is, however,
open to question, and the shorter period 1953-1955 will therefore be
used in this study as the principal base of comparison. In fact, as will
be seen in the next chapter, the relative changes in the major com-
ponents of the balance of payments are much the same whether one
takes the longer or the shorter period as a base. Nor is there much
difference in the size of the initial handicap presented by the balance-
of-payments deficits during the two periods, which averaged $1.8
billion for 1950-1955 and $1.7 billion for 1953-1955.
43